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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the people that I’ve taken, if they get denied [a 
protection order] . . . usually it’s just something in the 
writing.  If you didn’t express enough, there wasn’t 
enough of a description of why you’re in danger or why 
you—it just wasn’t clear.  It’s usually how they write it.1 
Domestic violence civil protection orders (“POs”) (also called 
protective orders, restraining orders, protection from abuse orders, and 
relief from abuse orders) are intended to increase victim safety by 
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prohibiting contact between a victim and abuser.2 Should an abuser 
violate the terms of the PO, the abuser can be arrested and prosecuted for 
that violation. Unlike criminal no-contact orders or criminal charges 
(where the victim is not a party to the case), POs are civil orders—thus 
victims initiating the PO process can request differing levels of 
protection depending on their specific needs and can ask to have an order 
dismissed at any time. Furthermore, victims filing for POs need not 
cooperate with law enforcement, pursue the arrest of their batterers, or 
assist with a criminal prosecution in order to qualify for an order, which 
are requirements of the U visa program.3 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, victims cannot violate a PO when they are the protected 
party. This means that even if they initiate contact with the abuser, they 
cannot be arrested or prosecuted for violating that order. This component 
is often misunderstood by victims and abusers frequently take advantage 
of that confusion, threatening to contact the police and have the victim 
arrested for violating the PO if they do not comply with the abuser’s 
demands.4 Only the respondent (the “abuser” or “defendant”) can be 
arrested for violating the order. 
For a PO to be issued, a “preponderance of the evidence” must show 
that the respondent has committed an act of violence against the 
petitioner (“victim,” “plaintiff,” or “protected party”) that meets the legal 
definition of domestic violence in that jurisdiction.5 There are many 
reasons why meeting this burden is difficult for victims.6 As acts of 
domestic violence often occur in private, there may be no witnesses to 
                                                                                                         
2 For more information about civil protection orders, see NAT’L CTR. ON PROT. 
ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, INCREASING 
YOUR SAFETY: FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR PROTECTION ORDERS (2011), available at htt
p://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/IncreasingSafety_031411_Web.pdf. 
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(III) (2012) (provision within the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000, providing lawful status to noncitizen 
crime victims—including victims of domestic violence—who are assisting or are willing 
to assist the authorities in investigating crimes). 
4 See CAROLYN HAM, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, INJUSTICE DEFINED: 
WHY BATTERED WOMEN CANNOT AND SHOUT NOT BE CHARGED WITH VIOLATING CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDERS THAT WERE ISSUED AT THEIR REQUEST (2003), available at 
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Injustice_Defined.pdf. 
5 See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, STANDARDS OF 
PROOF FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2009), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs/Standar
ds_of_Proof_by_State.authcheckdam.pdf (provides information on the standards of proof 
each state requires in protection order cases). 
6 See Alesha Durfee, Victim Narratives, Legal Representation, and Domestic Violence 
Civil Protection Orders, 4 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 7 (2009); JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED 
WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES (1999); Deborah M. 
Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly National 
and The Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2001). 
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corroborate the victim’s allegations. Additionally, victims may not report 
the violence or seek treatment from a health care provider and thus not 
have any external documentation.7 Finally, victims must navigate a 
bureaucracy that uses specialized language and specific procedures—for 
example, they must know the definitions of “petitioners,” “respondents,” 
and “service”—all at a time where they are traumatized, sleep deprived, 
and have more basic needs to meet such as shelter, food, clothing, and 
safe transportation to work, school, and/or court. All this occurs in a 
system where access to legal representation for civil cases is not 
guaranteed (though the defendant may have legal representation in a 
concurrent criminal case), the cost of a family court lawyer is 
prohibitive, and civil legal assistance programs are severely underfunded 
and cannot represent all victims seeking orders.8 
In response to these problems, there have been a number of 
significant changes made to the PO process, including the ability of 
petitioners to file for an order pro se9 and a lower evidentiary 
requirement for POs than in criminal cases (most states that specify a 
burden of proof in their legal statutes use a “preponderance of the 
evidence” as the threshold).10  Perhaps most importantly, in almost every 
state petitioners are “allowed” (but also required) to write a “narrative of 
abuse”—a section where victims, often in their own words, describe the 
abuse they have experienced and why they feel they need a PO.11 A 
                                                                                                         
7 See Jacqueline C. Campbell & Linda A. Lewandowski, Mental and Physical Health 
Effects of Intimate Partner Violence on Women and Children, 20 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS 
N. AM. 353 (1997). 
8 See generally LEGAL SERVICES CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT 2, 18 (2012), available at http://www.lsc.gov/about/annual-report (“In 
2012, the number of Americans eligible for LSC-funded legal assistance reached an all-
time high, more than 61 million, while LSC’s congressional appropriations fell to $348 
million, an all-time low in inflation-adjusted dollars.”) (reporting that family law cases 
represented about one-third of the cases closed by Legal Services Corporation each year 
and highlighting legal services provided to victims of domestic violence). 
9 See, e.g., Pro se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining pro se as 
“[o]ne who represents oneself in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer”). 
10 See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 5; see 
also Helen Eigenberg et al., Protective Order Legislation: Trends in State Statutes, 31 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 411 (2003). 
11 Alesha Durfee, Equal Access to Protection? Variations in State Protection Order 
Forms 15 (Apr. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). A 2014 review of 
forty-nine state protection forms available online indicated that only two state forms did 
not include a section for a narrative of abuse on the protection order petition (Vermont 
and South Dakota). Seventeen states (35%) allowed petitioners to check a box indicating 
the type of abuse experienced, but also required a narrative description of the abuse. 
Thirty states (61%) required a narrative, but did not have boxes available for petitioners 
to check. The space on the forms allocated for these narratives ranged from less than one 
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judge can then grant an order based on this narrative. From an outsider’s 
perspective, this part of the form is deceptively simple in that a victim 
describes what happened, the judge reads the form, and if the person is 
found to be a “real” victim an order is issued. Through these and other 
“victim-friendly” adaptations, POs are now considered to be “accessible” 
to all domestic violence victims. 
Yet previous research indicates that the PO process continues to 
reproduce broader social inequalities, even when “victim-friendly” 
procedures and policies are implemented.12 One of the reasons for this is 
that these “victim-friendly” policies, procedures, and adaptations are 
based on a series of unstated and often invalid assumptions about victims 
of domestic violence. The assumptions concern legal status, language 
ability, education level, attributions for abuse, beliefs about which forms 
of violence are the most severe, “appropriate” victim responses to abuse, 
safety priorities, and whether the victim wants to terminate the 
relationship. While these assumptions are true of some victims, they are 
not true of all victims, and thus the current process has led to differential 
outcomes for some groups of victims, including an increased likelihood 
that the judge will deny various components of the PO request or dismiss 
the PO altogether.13 
One of the points in the process where disparate outcomes emerge is 
in the creation of the narrative of abuse. It is difficult, at first, to see what 
could be problematic about asking a petitioner to describe why they need 
an order and then adjudicating the case based on that answer—in fact, it 
may appear that this is the most “victim-friendly” approach in cases of 
domestic violence where petitioners do not have legal representation. But 
this approach relies on a series of assumptions about domestic violence 
victims that are not true of all petitioners who have experienced domestic 
violence or in all protection order filings. For example, assumptions that 
domestic violence victims want to testify in a public setting about the 
abuse they have experienced, that they are able to vocalize/write what 
they have experienced, that they have enough distance from those events 
that they can fully discuss them, that what is most traumatizing to them is 
also what is legally relevant to a protection order filing, that they have 
specific information like dates, times, case numbers, etc., that the reason 
for seeking a PO is the most severe act of abuse a petitioner has 
experienced. As these assumptions about petitioners are implicit, rather 
than explicit, any failures of petitioners to successfully obtain protection 
                                                                                                         
line (South Carolina) to a full page or more. State forms for New Jersey and Wyoming 
were not available for review at the time of data collection. 
12 See Durfee, supra note 6. 
13 Id. 
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orders are attributed to the merits of the individual case instead of a 
systemic problem in the protection order process itself. 
If the narrative of abuse element of the PO petition is not the best 
way for all petitioners to provide testimony to the courts, what other 
options might states consider? I argue that in cases where the petitioner 
has external documentation of abuse, such as police reports or medical 
records, the narrative requirement should be waived. Instead, petitioners 
should be allowed to submit their external documentation to prove the 
allegations of domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence in 
order for a PO to be granted. In cases where the petitioner does not have 
external documentation of the abuse, they should be allowed to check 
boxes to indicate the form of victimization they have experienced and 
then provide external documentation that the abuse occurred with the PO 
petition at the time of the initial filing. By eliminating the narrative 
requirement, the courts would facilitate access to POs for all domestic 
violence victims, not just those who meet the assumptions described 
above. 
In this essay, I first give a brief overview of domestic violence civil 
POs. I then discuss the significance of narratives to the PO process and 
PO hearing outcomes, the mismatch between the priorities and goals of 
domestic violence victims as compared to those of the legal system, and 
the assumption that the construction of narratives is empowering for 
victims. Finally, I propose an alternative to the current narrative 
requirement for PO petitions. 
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS 
Although every jurisdiction in the United States has made some sort 
of civil protective order available to victims of domestic violence, the 
official term for and provisions of protective orders can vary 
dramatically by jurisdiction. Navigating each jurisdiction’s PO process 
can be confusing and frustrating for victims and their families, many of 
whom cross state lines in an attempt to hide from their abusers. These 
jurisdictional differences have also led to problems with the enforcement 
of orders, as police officers have to first determine what type of 
protective order was violated before they can make an arrest, which can 
be difficult if the order was violated in a different jurisdiction than the 
one that issued it. For example, in Connecticut a protection order is 
issued by a criminal court prohibiting contact between a victim and 
abuser in an active criminal case,14 while in Arizona a PO is a civil order 
                                                                                                         
14 CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH LAW LIBRARIES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 
CONNECTICUT: A GUIDE TO RESOURCES IN THE LAW LIBRARY (Catherine Hogan Mozur 
ed., 2013), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/Notebooks/Pathfinders/DomesticVi
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prohibiting contact that is separate from any criminal proceedings.15 A 
victim who reports a violation in Arizona of a PO issued in Connecticut 
is likely to get a different response from police officers in Arizona than 
from officers in Connecticut, simply because of the differences in names 
and definitions between the two states. Compounding the problem of 
differing terminology among states is that the substantive provisions of 
POs also differ by state: in addition to prohibiting contact between the 
victim and the abuser, in some states POs can be used to evict the abuser 
from a shared residence; to set temporary custody, visitation, or spousal 
support; and/or allow the police to seize any weapons the abuser 
possesses.16 Enforcing POs from other states has been highly problematic 
and was one of the catalysts for Project Passport (an effort to standardize 
orders across the United States).17 
Once an order is issued, the respondent must be legally served with 
or notified of the PO in order for it to be valid (and thus enforceable).18 
After the PO has been served, under the “full faith and credit” provision 
in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) it is enforceable in any 
jurisdiction in the United States.19 Full faith and credit applies to all POs, 
even if the victim would not qualify for an order in the jurisdiction where 
the order is violated. For example, an order obtained by a victim of abuse 
by a same-sex partner is enforceable even in jurisdictions where violence 
within same-sex partnerships is explicitly excluded by statute from the 
legal definition of domestic violence.20 Orders can also vary in length 
                                                                                                         
olence/DomesticViolence.pdf (explaining the difference between restraining orders and 
protective orders under Connecticut law). 
15 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602 (2013) (providing the grounds and procedure for 
granting an order of protection in order to restrain a person from committing an act 
including domestic violence). 
16 See Eigenberg et al., supra note 10. 
17 See NAT’L CTR. ON PROT. ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, BATTERED WOMEN’S 
JUSTICE PROJECT, PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICER’S GUIDE TO ENFORCING PROTECTION ORDERS NATIONWIDE (2011), available at 
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/LawEnforcement_031411_Web.pdf. 
18 Id. 
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012) (ensuring that a valid protection order—as defined in 
subsection (b) of this same provision—“shall be accorded full faith and credit by the 
court of another State, Indian tribe or territory . . . and enforced by the court and law 
enforcement personnel . . . as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe”) 
(emphasis added); see also NAT’L CTR. ON PROT. ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, 
BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR PROTECTION 
ORDERS: ASSISTING SURVIVORS WITH ENFORCEMENT ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL LINES 
(2011), available at http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/New_Advocate_031411_Web.
pdf [hereinafter ASSISTING SURVIVORS]. 
20 ASSISTING SURVIVORS, supra note 19, at 5. 
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from one day (for a temporary order) to a lifetime order; nearly all states 
allow victims to renew their orders prior to the PO’s expiration date.21 
The number of PO filings has dramatically increased over time, and 
they now constitute a significant proportion of the domestic relations 
caseloads in several states.22 For example, in Arizona alone, fifteen 
percent of all civil court filings in 2013 were requests for some sort of 
protective order.23 Nationally, a recent study estimated that most 
metropolitan courts each process approximately 3,000 to 4,000 POs 
every year.24 While this increase in PO filings and issuances has led to 
increased expenditures, Logan, Walker, and Hoyt estimate that in 2007, 
Kentucky saved approximately $85.5 million in one year by issuing 
11,212 POs ($30.75 for every $1 spent).25 
Even though the total number of PO filings has increased, only a 
small proportion of victims file for orders. Tjaden and Thoennes26 found 
that only 17% of adult female intimate partner violence (IPV) victims in 
the United States filed for and received POs. One would expect that 
victims accessing services would have higher rates of PO use (if they are 
seeking one type of formal support they may be more likely to seek other 
formal support), but in one study only 12% of victims who had contacted 
police obtained a PO in the next year,27 and in a separate study only 16% 
of victims residing in domestic violence shelters currently had a PO.28 
Women with children are more likely to contact the police after 
                                                                                                         
21 Id.; see also Eigenberg et al., supra note 10. 
22 See R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 17 (National Center for State Courts 2012), available 
at http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20P
DF/CSP_DEC.ashx (of note, civil protection orders constituted 41% of the domestic 
relations caseload in Missouri, 36% in New Hampshire, and 28% in North Carolina and 
Nebraska). 
23 Id. 
24 BRENDA K. UEKERT ET AL., THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SERVING 
LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT (LEP) BATTERED WOMEN: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE 
COURTS’ CAPACITY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION ORDERS 59 (2006), available at https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/216072.pdf. 
25 T.K. Logan et al., The Economic Costs of Partner Violence and the Cost-Benefit of 
Civil Protective Orders, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1137, 1147 (2012). 
26 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 52 (2000), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf. 
27 Victoria Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Reported 
Violence, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 589, 589–594 (2002). 
28 Alesha Durfee & Jill Theresa Messing, The Decision to Obtain a Protection Order 
Among Victims of Intimate Partner Violence: An Application of Legal Mobilization 
Theory, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 701, 701–10 (2012). 
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experiencing violence29 and to obtain a PO if they have left the 
relationship,30 most likely because women often report leaving violent 
relationships to protect their children.31 Victims with higher income and 
education levels are more likely to have POs,32 and white female IPV 
victims are more likely to engage in legal help-seeking than other 
women.33 Finally, immigrant women are less likely to use legal resources 
and are less likely to file for a protection order because of concerns about 
their and their abusers’ immigration status.34 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NARRATIVES 
The narrative requirement should be a central focus of reform efforts 
because of the significance of narratives on PO hearing outcomes. One of 
the key differences between the PO process and all other legal 
interventions for domestic violence is the direct impact of the language 
of petitioners and respondents on case outcomes.35 As stated previously, 
many victims do not have external documentation (medical records, 
copies of police reports, etc.) of their victimization; others are seeking 
PO on an emergency basis and do not have access to their records/files. 
In these cases, the only evidence supporting the claim that a PO is 
warranted may be the narrative of abuse written by the petitioner—who 
may be in a state of trauma, have no knowledge of the legal requirements 
for a PO, and who may not have access to any form of legal assistance. 
To contest the PO, the respondent then files an affidavit disputing the 
petitioner’s claims—an affidavit that, like the initial filing, is written 
without any legal assistance and without knowledge of the legal 
requirements for the entry of an order. In police reports and criminal 
cases legal actors paraphrase statements made by the victim and abuser 
and select specific quotes that best illustrate and support their claims. In 
PO filings, the entire document is directly constructed by the petitioner 
                                                                                                         
29 Amy E. Bonomi et al., Severity of Intimate Partner Violence and Occurrence and 
Frequency of Police Calls, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1354, 1354–1364 (2006). 
30 Durfee & Messing, supra note 28. 
31 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
32 Durfee & Messing, supra note 28. 
33 Rebecca J. Macy et al., Battered Women’s Profiles Associated with Service Help-
Seeking Efforts: Illuminating Opportunities for Intervention, 29 SOCIAL WORK RES. 137 
(2005). 
34 MARY ANN DUTTON ET AL., USE AND OUTCOMES OF PROTECTION ORDERS BY 
BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/218255.pdf; Cecilia Menjívar & Olivia Salcido, Immigrant Women and Domestic 
Violence: Common Experiences in Different Countries, 16 GENDER & SOC’Y 898 (2002); 
Merry Morash et al., Risk Factors for Abusive Relationships: A Study of Vietnamese 
American Immigrant Women, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 653 (2007). 
35 Durfee, supra note 6. 
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and respondent. And in many cases, the ability to construct a narrative 
determines the case outcome. 
As PO filings are civil cases, legal representation and legal assistance 
are not guaranteed, and many petitioners and respondents navigate the 
process on their own. In order to make POs accessible to victims without 
legal representation, many states have created “victim-friendly” forms 
and instructions that use “everyday” language to help victims understand 
which forms to file, how to complete and where to file the forms, and 
what to expect during the PO process. These forms are available in 
multiple languages in order to provide access to victims with limited 
English proficiency.36 Yet, embedded in these adaptations are three core 
assumptions about victims and narratives: (1) that victims share the same 
priorities, definitions of abuse, and goals as the legal system; (2) that 
given instructions, victims can write narratives within institutional 
constraints; and (3) that victims not only want to, but are empowered by 
writing their narratives. If these assumptions are not met, the petitioner 
may not be able to complete the PO process and/or receive a PO. Until 
these assumptions are critically examined and addressed, the narrative 
requirement will continue to be a structural barrier preventing victims 
who cannot construct a “legitimate” narrative for filing for and/or 
obtaining POs. 
IV. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN PRIORITIES OF VICTIMS AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
Yesterday was the last straw when he verbally abused 
me all the way home from his mother’s house on 
mother’s day . . . .He did this all in front of our daughter. 
He told me I was a bitch, he only used me for money and 
sex, I’m pathetic because I have no friends, he’s sorry 
I’m the mother of his child, and a bunch of other things I 
can’t even bring myself to write on paper. Two weeks 
ago P & I got into a verbal altercation because of another 
girl & because of the way he speaks to me & he punched 
me in the back of the head twice with a closed fist.37 
The quote above comes from the beginning of a relatively lengthy 
narrative of abuse included with a PO petition, and is an example of the 
mismatch between the priorities, definitions of abuse, and goals of 
domestic violence victims and those that are assumed by the legal system 
and legal actors. From a legal perspective, only the physical violence 
                                                                                                         
36 For a more detailed discussion, see UEKERT ET AL., supra note 24. 
37 Durfee, supra note 6, at 19. 
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described by the petitioner can be classified as domestic violence (“he 
punched me”). In fact, if this narrative were written by a lawyer, it is 
likely that the physical violence would be the central focus of the 
narrative of abuse. The narrative would contain the date, time, and 
location of the action; the names and contact information of any 
witnesses; and what happened as a result of the “punch” (if she called 
police, received medical treatment, etc.). The verbal and symbolic abuse 
(what was said, when it was said, and the fact that it was said in front of 
her daughter) may be indicative of a poor relationship, but the state does 
not consider this to be as important as the physical violence. According 
to state statutes, this verbal and symbolic abuse is not domestic violence 
and this event would not be sufficient to merit a PO. 
As this narrative was written by the victim, without legal assistance, 
the structure and emphasis of the narrative is very different than what 
would be submitted by a lawyer. According to Ewick & Silbey,38 the 
structure of a narrative—including the selective inclusion and exclusion 
of events and persons and the order in which they are discussed—reveal 
their significance and meaning to the narrator. In this case, the petitioner 
first describes verbal violence (calling her a “bitch” and “pathetic”; 
stating he’s using her “for money and sex”) and symbolic violence 
(doing it on Mother’s Day in front of her daughter) and spends a greater 
proportion of the narrative on the description of these events. From the 
narrative, it appears that the verbal and symbolic violence is more 
traumatic than the physical violence described later in the petition and 
that it was the verbal and symbolic violence, not the physical violence, 
which caused her to file for a PO. This disjuncture between the narrative 
a lawyer would write and the narrative a victim would write is only one 
of a series of “mismatches” between the priorities, goals, and definitions 
of violence between the legal system and the victims that it is supposed 
to serve. 
Furthermore, the focus of the narrative on verbal and symbolic 
violence (instead of physical violence) also violates social stereotypes 
about what “real” victims are like and how they should respond to 
violence.39 A “real” victim would leave her abuser after experiencing an 
act of physical violence as severe as “punching” or “slapping”; but 
according to her narrative, this victim remained in the relationship for at 
least two weeks after being “punched.” From a legal perspective, this 
makes no sense—why would a “real” victim leave after being called a 
bitch, but not after being punched? 
                                                                                                         
38 See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversie Stories and Hegemonic Tales: 
Towards a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 197 (1995). 
39 Durfee, supra note 6. 
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The idea that verbal and psychological abuse is more harmful than 
physical abuse appears frequently in narratives of abuse filed by 
petitioners. In a separate case, a different petitioner wrote:  
I HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1 YEARS WORTH OF 
DATED, DOCUMENTED journal of DAILY 
PHYSCOLOGICAL ABUSE PERSONALLY I 
WOULD RATHER HAVE A BLACK EYE, THAT 
WAY PEOPLE & OFFICIALS WOULD REALIZE 
THIS FORM OF ABUSE IS FAR MORE detrimental to 
the CHILDREN IN QUESTION.40 
As a researcher and former domestic violence advocate, I have heard 
victims make similar statements over and over again—that verbal, 
psychological, and symbolic violence is more hurtful and detrimental 
than physical abuse, most often because it is not viewed as “real” abuse 
by others (including legal actors such as police and judges). In PO 
filings, the allegations of a petitioner who writes that she would want to 
experience physical abuse severe enough to cause a “black eye” instead 
of “psychological” abuse are less likely to be believed because a “real” 
victim of domestic violence would not want to be physically assaulted. In 
that case, the judge denied the victim’s request for a PO. In both of these 
PO cases, the narrative of abuse proved more damaging than helpful, and 
both victims would have been better served by relying on external 
documentation of their abuse. 
Finally, to receive a PO in Arizona (as in most states), a petitioner 
must have either experienced an act of domestic violence (often within a 
specific time frame) or have a “reasonable” fear that an act of domestic 
violence will occur.41 While it is “victims” who merit POs, many 
petitioners do not want to be perceived as victims; as Martha Mahoney 
notes, “women often emphasize that they do not fit their own stereotypes 
of the battered woman” and have a “fear” that they will be identified as a 
“battered woman.”42 Men who experience intimate partner victimization 
are even less likely to identify as a domestic violence victim than are 
women43 because of what it means to be a “man” in American society.44 I 
                                                                                                         
40 Durfee, supra note 6, at 20 (note that statement is exactly as written in petition). 
41 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-3602 (2013). 
42 Mahoney, supra note 31, at 9. 
43 Alesha Durfee, “I’m Not a Victim, She’s an Abuser”: Masculinity, Victimization, 
and Protection Orders, 25 GENDER & SOC’Y 316 (2011). 
44 Mimi Schippers, Recovering the Feminine Other: Masculinity, Femininity, and 
Gender Hegemony, 36 THEORY & SOC’Y 85, 94 (2007) (Hegemonic masculinity “is the 
[set of] qualities defined as manly that establish and legitimate a hierarchical and 
complementary relationship to femininity that, by doing so, guarantee the dominant 
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argue elsewhere that men are more likely than women to have their PO 
requests denied because their descriptions of themselves, their female 
partners, and the events described in their narratives of abuse do not 
conform to stereotypes about domestic violence victimization, “victims,” 
and “abusers.”45 By requiring petitioners to write a narrative of abuse, the 
state disadvantages those petitioners who do not share the same 
priorities, definitions of abuse, and goals as those of stereotypical 
victims. 
V. WRITING NARRATIVES WITHIN INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
Because of this gap between the definitions of abuse, priorities, and 
goals of victims and those of the legal system, narratives filed by 
petitioners without legal representation are significantly less likely to 
result in a PO than are those filed with legal representation. PO 
narratives that focus on acts of violence that meet the legal definition of 
domestic violence, are temporally ordered, and provide specific details 
such as the time, date, location, and consequences of the action (the need 
for medical care, whether there was an arrest made or charges filed, etc.) 
are more likely to result in a PO than are other narratives, especially in 
those cases where the respondent has a lawyer.46 
Part of the mismatch between the narratives preferred by legal actors 
and those written by pro se litigants may ironically be attributable to the 
“victim-friendly” adaptations that have been made to the PO petition and 
instructions. On the PO form in Arizona, the narrative element of the 
petition begins with the prompt “I need a Court Order because . . . .”47 
The unstated assumption is that the reason the victim is seeking an order 
is the same one that the state would consider to be legally relevant to the 
case. However, in the petition above, the petitioner is seeking the order 
because of the incidents on Mother’s Day—not the events that are legally 
defined as domestic violence. Thus, asking the petitioner to write why 
she is seeking an order, but adjudicating that response according to legal 
standards that are not communicated to the petitioner, is not a “victim-
friendly” adaptation. Instead, it provides the foundation for a system 
where victims are blamed for their own inability to obtain a PO. 
                                                                                                         
position of men and the subordination of women.”). For discussions of masculinities, see 
Durfee, supra note 43, at 328–332; Kristin L. Anderson & Debra Umberson, Gendering 
Violence: Masculinity and Power in Men’s Accounts of Domestic Violence, 15 GENDER & 
SOC’Y 358 (2001); R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity: 
Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829 (2005). 
45 Durfee, supra note 43, at 328–332. 
46 Durfee, supra note 6. 
47 AZ. JUD. BRANCH, ADMIN. DIRECTIVE NOS. 2013–03, 2006–01, PROTECTIVE ORDER 
FORMS APPROVED FOR USE BEGINNING ON JANUARY 1, 2007 (2013). 
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A second prompt used to assist victims in constructing their 
narratives of abuse is the request for the petitioner to describe the “most 
recent incident or threat of violence and date.”48 Again, there are unstated 
and often invalid assumptions that justify this as a “victim-friendly” 
adaptation. First, the courts are assuming that violent relationships have a 
linear trajectory; that is, the violence gets worse over time, so the last 
event would be the most severe event. While this may be true of some 
violent relationships, research has shown that there is a wide variation in 
trajectories of violent relationships49—and if the last event is not the 
most violent event, the judge may not have the information needed to 
make an accurate assessment of the respondent’s dangerousness. Second, 
this instruction implies that victims leave their abusers in response to 
what the legal system considers to be the most “severe” act of physical or 
sexual violence,50 as well as the reasons victims give for leaving or 
remaining in violent relationships.51 In the case described above, the last 
act of violence would not qualify for a PO, and the judge would deny an 
order when one is merited. Thus even though the use of “victim-friendly” 
language helps victims more easily understand and complete the PO 
forms, the legal basis for an order (the legal definition of domestic 
violence and the legal requirements for a PO to be issued) remains 
unchanged, making it even more difficult for victims to obtain an order. 
VI. ARE NARRATIVES EMPOWERING? 
When they’re doing the paperwork, some are very 
disconnected, and then some are very emotional, where 
it’s just like writing it down scares the crap out of them. 
It’s very hard, and they’re crying, and we have to do 
some breathing techniques, just through the talking, on 
that portion . . . you gotta tell your whole story in . . . 
about ten sentences.52 
                                                                                                         
48 PATTERN FORMS COMM. AND THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, STATE OF WASH., 
WPF DV 1.015, PETITION FOR ORDER OF PROTECTION (2014). 
49 Mary Ann Dutton et al., Patterns of Intimate Partner Violence: Correlates and 
Outcomes, 20 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 483, 483–97 (2005). 
50 Deborah K. Anderson & Daniel G. Saunders, Leaving an Abusive Partner: An 
Empirical Review of Predictors, the Process of Leaving, and Psychological Well-Being, 4 
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 163 (2003) (listing a comprehensive discussion of theories 
of victimization and the ability to leave violent relationships). 
51 Margaret E. Bell et al., The Dynamics of Staying and Leaving: Implications for 
Battered Women’s Emotional Well-Being and Experiences of Violence at the End of a 
Year, 22 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 413 (2007). 
52 Advocate interview 10/14/2013 for Alesha Durfee and Jill Theresa Messing, LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION AND INTIMATE PARTNER VICTIMIZATION, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 
(Grant No. 1154098). 
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Another implicit assumption about victims that has been 
incorporated into the current PO process is that victims are empowered 
by telling their stories in the courtroom. For some victims, writing the 
narrative of abuse and testifying in court is the first time they have 
confronted their abuser or shared their experiences. In these cases, the 
receipt of a PO may affirm, validate, and empower the petitioner. The 
idea that telling one’s story is empowering for a victim has led feminists, 
activists, and advocates to describe a PO as “a symbol of her [the 
victim’s] own internalized strength  . . . a turning point for change . . . a 
vision of a better life in the future.”53 With the right support and in the 
right environment, victims will want to tell their stories and will be 
empowered and validated through that retelling. Thus it would make 
sense to push for the further education of judges and other legal actors 
about domestic violence and to prioritize the creation of “space” to allow 
victims to tell their stories in the courts. 
However, the adversarial nature of the legal system, in combination 
with complex and confusing bureaucratic procedures and untrained court 
staff, may make the PO process an incredibly traumatizing experience—
even with the “right” support and in the “right” environment. As Judith 
Herman observes, “If one set out intentionally to design a system for 
provoking symptoms of traumatic stress, it might look very much like a 
court of law.”54 Even with “victim-friendly” changes and staff/judicial 
education and training, for many petitioners the physical act of writing a 
narrative of abuse will remain a traumatic and revictimizing experience. 
In order to write the narrative of abuse, a victim must relive acts of 
victimization and recall specific details about events that they have 
repressed simply in order to survive. I interviewed a domestic violence 
advocate in 2013 who spoke of victims in shelters writing a single 
paragraph each day for their U visa application—even with a supportive 
advocate and a non-threatening environment, the victims felt too 
traumatized to write any more than the one paragraph. As the advocate 
said, “they’re trying to forget what happened and here I am, asking them 
to write down, with as many details as they can, what they went 
through.”55 
Finally, by adjudicating cases based on personal narratives of abuse, 
the courts unintentionally adjudicate victims themselves. A petitioner 
who is denied a PO may feel that they were not believed—that their 
                                                                                                         
53 Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When “Enough is Enough”: Battered Women’s 
Decision Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 414, 
424 (1995). 
54 Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 571, 574 (2005). 
55 Advocate interview, supra note 52. 
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stories do not count and their words do not matter—and, like when they 
experience a dual arrest or criminal prosecution, “the victim probably 
will not try the system for further protection.”56 Yet the research 
described in this paper suggests that in some cases, it was not the 
petitioner’s experiences that were adjudicated—it was their ability to 
describe those experiences that dictated whether they were able to obtain 
an order. 
VII. RECONSIDERING THE NARRATIVE REQUIREMENT 
ALTERNATIVES 
The civil court system, through the provision of POs, can be an 
important part of a “safety net that protects victims and holds 
perpetrators accountable for their actions.”57 However, it is important to 
critically examine not only the explicit institutional practices associated 
with the PO process, but also the implicit assumptions that underlie those 
institutional practices. The narrative of abuse requirement is seen as a 
“victim-friendly” adaptation to the PO process so that victims could use 
their own testimony as grounds for a PO. However, the requirement that 
all petitioners submit a narrative of abuse with their PO petition has had 
unintended negative consequences for some groups of victims. Victims 
who do not share the same priorities, definitions of abuse, and goals as 
the legal system; who cannot write narratives within institutional 
constraints that are consistent with stereotypes about domestic violence 
and victimization; and who are not empowered by writing their 
narratives or telling their stories are less likely to receive a PO—even if 
they are able to complete the PO process. Because this requirement was 
meant to facilitate access to a greater number of victims, it should be 
removed in order to achieve that goal. 
In order to protect the rights of respondents, however, petitioners 
need to submit some sort of evidence to support their claims of 
victimization (or imminent victimization). To balance the rights of 
respondents with the needs of petitioners, petitioners who have external 
documentation of their victimization (such as medical records or police 
reports) should be allowed to submit copies of that documentation in 
place of the narrative of abuse. In order to facilitate case processing, 
courts could add a section to the PO form that asks petitioners to check a 
box indicating which form of victimization they have experienced. Some 
states, such as Louisiana, have already made adjustments to their PO 
                                                                                                         
56 Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 427 (1991). 
57 Ruth E. Fleury-Steiner et al., Contextual Factors Impacting Battered Women’s 
Intentions to Reuse the Criminal Legal System, 34 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 327, 340 
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forms by providing petitioners with a list where victims can indicate the 
form of abuse they have experienced by making a checkmark58—but the  
petitioner is still required to submit a narrative of abuse.59 In cases where 
the petitioner has a police report or medical records documenting the 
particular form of abuse indicated by the petitioner on the form, the 
narrative requirement should be waived. The respondent can then access 
the records submitted with the PO petition to determine the exact nature 
of the allegations made by the petitioner, thereby allowing the 
respondent to contest those allegations in the PO hearing or in a 
subsequent hearing. This change would balance the rights of respondents 
to know the allegations that have been made by petitioners with the 
needs of petitioners to be able to communicate information about their 
victimization in way that is less traumatizing than the current system and 
provides equal access to orders to victims who do not meet the unstated 
assumptions of the current system. 
Deborah Epstein, Margret Bell, and Lisa Goodman argue that 
“effective advocacy” for victims “requires more than mere 
accompaniment in the courtroom or a conversation about how to 
navigate the court system.”60 Meaningful access to legal protections 
against domestic violence can be achieved through a critical assessment 
of the PO process in conjunction with the institutional policies and 
procedures associated with that process and the assumptions about 
victims that underlie that process. Certainly this proposal is not a solution 
to the problems created by the narrative of abuse requirement—access to 
external documentation is not available to all victims and the ability to 
obtain external documentation differs by legal status, sexuality, race, 
ethnicity, etc. But a discussion of the shortcomings of the current “victim 
friendly” system, especially the requirement of the narrative of abuse, is 
long overdue. My hope is that this essay can lead to a dialogue about 
assumptions that have prevented victims from accessing legal protections 
against domestic violence. 
                                                                                                         
58 La. Protective Order Registry, JUD. ADMR’S OFFICE LA. SUP. CT., http://www.
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“Download full set of forms” hyperlink; ¶ 8, § A). 
59 Id. at ¶ 8, § B. 
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